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Abstract 
We study the relation between workers’ age and their productivity 
in work teams, based on a new and unique data set that combines data 
on errors occurring in the production process of a large car manufac-
turer with detailed information on the personal characteristics of 
workers related to the errors. We correct for non-random sample selec-
tion and the potential endogeneity of the age-composition in work 
teams. Our results suggest that productivity in this plant which is typ-
ical for large-scale manufacturing does not decline at least up to age 
60. 
JEL codes: J24, J14, D24 
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1 Introduction 
Productivity is at the core of economics. Growth in modern economies is domi-
nated by productivity growth (Maddison, 2001). Employers are keen to increase 
productivity of their workers as this is an essential element in competition across 
firms. Population aging now gives productivity a new dimension: older workers 
are often thought to be less productive. This impression is widespread and implic-
it in many discussions about aging, even in our economic textbooks.1 If the im-
pression were true, population aging would have negative effects on overall 
productivity as the share of older workers is increasing, and would thus directly 
reduce economic growth. This would amplify the economic strains on aging socie-
ties already exerted by increasing Social Security and Medicare bills. The im-
pression of declining productivity by age has also implications on the micro level, 
e.g. on personnel policies by employers and on retirement choices made by em-
ployees. In many countries, the assertion that productivity declines with age is 
used as a motivation for early retirement policies. This paper provides new and 
maybe surprising evidence on the age-productivity relation, shedding doubt on 
the wide-spread assertion at least for the age range which is commonly referred 
to as the “early retirement window”. 
Labor economists have a long-standing tradition to study the productivity of 
workers. Recent papers have focused on the relation between incentives, coopera-
tion, peer effects, supervision, and productivity in work teams (Bandiera et. al. 
(2005, 2007, 2009, 2010), Lazear (2000), Lazear et. al. (2011), Mas and Moretti 
(2007)). Also estimating age-productivity profiles has been on the agenda of labor 
economists for a long time, see the surveys by Skirbekk (2004), Gelderblom 
(2006), and Labour Economics’ recent “Special Issue: Ageing and Productivity” 
(Vol. 22, June 2013)2. Such studies, however, have encountered three fundamen-
tal challenges: measurement, selectivity/endogeneity, and aggregation. These 
methodological challenges have made it hard to distinguish fact from fiction. This 
paper and the underlying large data collection effort are tailored to overcome 
these difficulties. 
First, productivity is hard to measure directly. While it is well documented by 
occupational medicine, cognitive psychology, and gerontology that muscle 
strength, sight, lung, kidney, and heart functioning, and many other biometric 
indicators deteriorate from early age onwards, experience and the ability to deal 
                                                 
1 E.g., Lazear (1995, p. 40, figure 4.1) 
2 Bloom and Sousa-Poza (2013), Göbel and Zwick (2013), Lovàsz and Rigó (2013), Mahlberg et. al. (2013), 
Romeu Gordo and Skirbekk (2013), and Vandenberghe (2013). 
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with human nature appear to increase with age. Since the latter characteristics 
are hard to measure, there is a bias towards direct measures that decline early in 
life. This may have contributed to the above-mentioned impression. 
A second challenge is the potential endogeneity of the age composition 
through various selection processes. Being in the labor force is endogenous since 
employers are more likely to hold on to productive than unproductive workers. 
Hence plant closures and early retirement tend to create a positive selection of 
productive workers. A related endogeneity problem exists for the age-structure on 
the company level. Since more productive firms are usually more profitable, they 
expand and increase their workforce. This leads to a rejuvenation of their work-
force because new hires are more likely to be young. Relating productivity to the 
age of the workforce in this case results in a spurious negative correlation be-
tween productivity and age. 
Finding the right level of aggregation is the third challenge. An individualistic 
view fails to take into account that workers often work in teams and thereby af-
fect one another’s productivity. Older workers may devote some of their working 
time to helping or teaching younger workers. In this case, an individualistic ap-
proach will underestimate older workers’ and overestimate younger workers’ 
productivity.3 Related aspects are workers’ contributions to their team’s work 
climate and how teams deal with emergency situations. A plant or company view, 
on the other hand, obscures job heterogeneity and its interaction with motivation 
and thus productivity. One would expect, e.g., that the productivity effect of older 
workers on the shop floor whose careers have peaked is quite different from the 
productivity effect of equally old managers who still might have ambitions for a 
position at the company’s top or a realistic chance to move to another company. 
Plant view regressions that average over different non-linear age-productivity 
profiles might therefore create misinterpretations. 
We have assembled a unique combination of company data that permit us to 
overcome these problems in an unprecedented way. The data have three innova-
tive elements. First, we measure productivity in an assembly line environment in 
which the time to produce a unit of output is as standardized as the quality of the 
final product. As the assembly line has the same speed for all work teams and the 
design of the trucks is pre-defined, more productive work teams are not able to 
produce more or better output than less productive work teams. Workers, howev-
er, make errors which are detected at end control. More productive work teams 
differ from less productive work teams only in the errors they make. We therefore 
                                                 
3 In principle, it can also be the other way round: Young workers helping the old. In either case, the individu-
alistic approach fails. 
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use the number and severity of production errors during the assembly process as 
a precise and well-observed measure of productivity. We exploit the daily varia-
tion in the team composition of work teams over four years to identify the age-
productivity profiles both on the work team and the individual workers’ level. 
Second, we have merged the production error data with longitudinal person-
nel data. This permits us to hold a broad range of workers’ characteristics con-
stant and, most importantly, to correct for the selection effects marring so many 
earlier studies due to the endogeneity of early retirement and redundancy deci-
sions by employees and employers to productivity. 
Third, we measure the joint productivity of workers in a work team. This 
takes into account the individual worker’s contribution to his co-workers’ produc-
tivity. Particularly the contribution of older workers’ may be underestimated if 
productivity is measured at an individual level. Examples for such potential con-
tributions to a team’s productivity are the instruction of younger workers,4 being 
relaxed in tense or hectic situations, and contributing positively to the work cli-
mate. We think that our approach solves the major aggregation problems in ear-
lier studies. 
Earlier studies can be broadly divided into four groups. There are many stud-
ies relating plant level productivity to the age of the plants’ employees.5  Plant 
level productivity can be measured easily and reliably but the level of aggrega-
tion is quite high when the goal is to study the relation between productivity and 
age. Furthermore, the age structure of companies is probably not exogenous as 
pointed out before. 
A second group of studies uses individual’s wages as a productivity measure.6  
Wages, however, often increase with age and/or seniority independently of 
productivity, and wage decreases are extremely rare.7 
                                                 
4 If an older worker helps a younger worker, the older worker’s productivity, narrowly defined by individual, 
is zero as the older worker is not producing anything at that time. The contribution to the work team’s productiv-
ity, however, is positive. 
5 E.g., Hellerstein and Neumark (2004), Hellerstein et al. (1999), Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999, 
2007) for the U.S., Hægeland and Klette (1999) for Norway, Aubert (2003), Crépon, Deniau, and Pérez-Duarte 
(2003), Aubert and Crépon (2007) for France, Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) for Israel, Grund and 
Westergård-Nielsen (2008) for Denmark, Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005, 2007), Daveri and Maliranta (2007) 
for Finland, Malmberg et al. (2008) for Sweden, Dostie (2011) for Canada, Prskawetz et al. (2006) for Austria 
and Sweden, Lallemand and Ryckx (2009) for Belgium, van Ours (2009) for the Netherlands, Schneider (2007), 
Göbel and Zwick (2009) for Germany. 
6 E.g., Kotlikoff and Wise (1989), Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992), and Laitner and Stolyarov (2005). 
7 Lazear (1979) and (1981) explains the increasing age-earning profiles with incentive effects. Loewenstein 
and Sicherman (1991) and Frank and Hutchens (1993) show in experiments that workers have a preference for 
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Third, a group of studies relies on managers’ subjective evaluations of their 
employees’ performance.8 These supervisors’ assessments are problematic be-
cause they may reflect prejudices about age-productivity profiles. 
There are finally many studies which employ direct measures of individual 
productivity like, e.g., the number and quality of publications or Nobel prizes in 
academic research,9 the number and quality of completed court cases,10 the value 
of artists’ paintings,11 or performance in sports and chess.12  These studies are 
able to measure productivity quite precisely but the range of occupations, where 
this approach is feasible, is small. Moreover, these studies usually refer to top 
performance. In everyday work life, however, the workflow is customized to aver-
age rather than top performance. 
Our study is most closely related to this fourth group but relates to average 
performance. We have compiled our data from a truck assembly plant owned by a 
large German car manufacturer with plants in Asia, Europe and the U.S. At this 
plant, trucks are assembled by work teams on an assembly line. We have selected 
this plant because it features a taylorized production process typical for the man-
ufacturing industry, and because it stacks our cards against finding flat or in-
creasing productivity with age. Compared to many service-sector jobs, produc-
tivity in this plant requires more physical strength, dexterity, agility etc. (which 
tend to decline with age) than experience and knowledge of the human nature 
(which tend to increase with age). 
Seen in this light, our results are striking. Due to the very large number of ob-
servations and our identification strategy, we are able to estimate rather precise 
age-productivity profiles at the individual level and at the level of a work team. 
These profiles do not show a decline in the relevant age range between 25 and 65 
years of age. On the individual workers’ level, our average productivity measure 
actually increases monotonically up to age 65.  
We conclude that even in a work environment requiring substantial physical 
strength, its decline with age is compensated by characteristics that appear to 
increase with age and are hard to measure directly, such as experience and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
increasing wage profiles and explain this with loss aversion and problems of self-control. 
8 E.g., Medoff and Abraham (1980), Hunter and Hunter (1984), McEvoy and Cascio (1989), Salthouse and 
Maurer (1996), and Schneider and Stein (2006). 
9 Jones (2010), Jones and Weinberg (2011), Weinberg and Galenson (2005), van Ours (2009). 
10 Backes-Gellner, et al. (2011). 
11 Galenson and Weinberg (2000) and (2001), Galenson (2009) and Bayer et al. (2009). 
12 Fair (1994), (2005), and (2007), van Ours (2009),  and Castellucci et al. (2011). 
 6 
ability to operate well in a team when tense situations occur, typically when 
things go wrong and there is little time to fix them. 
Our study is also loosely related to a series of papers that study the relation 
between incentives, cooperation, peer effects, supervision and productivity in 
work teams (Bandiera et. al. (2005, 2007, 2009, 2010), Lazear (2000), Lazear et. 
al. (2011), Mas and Moretti (2007)). These papers study work teams in environ-
ments where variations in payment schemes, social networks, and supervisors 
can be used to identify effects on productivity.  
In the assembly plant of our study, wages are paid according to a collective 
agreement between employers and a labor union. Workers are classified into 
wage groups according to the tasks they perform. Workers cannot affect their 
wage income through higher or lower effort (i) for contractual reasons and (ii) 
because their employer is not allowed and not able to monitor workers’ productiv-
ity.13 This is rooted in the German labor law and happens to be of great ad-
vantage for our study as we can be confident that the age productivity profiles we 
estimate are not confounded by incentive effects. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present our data 
set, our productivity measure, and descriptive statistics. Section 3 is devoted to 
our identification strategy, in particular our solution to the endogeneity and se-
lection problems and the separation of age from cohort and time effects. Section 4 
presents our results at the individual and the work team level. Section 5 provides 
conclusions. An extensive appendix with methodological details is available on 
request. 
2 The data 
The truck assembly plant is located in the South of Germany and owned by 
Mercedes-Benz. Similar plants are located elsewhere in Europe, in the U.S. 
(“Freightliner”), and Asia. It has two stages: the assembly line and a quality con-
trol unit. 
The assembly line is divided into 50 work stations that are located one after 
another. The number of work teams is double the number of work stations be-
                                                 
13 When the recording of errors was introduced in the plant, the works council vetoed the linkage of the error 
data to the personnel data. We are grateful to the works council that they allowed us to establish an anonymized 
version of such a link for our study. While we cannot attribute a specific error to a specific person, we can attrib-
ute the number and weight of errors to a set of personnel characteristics such as age, sex, etc. 
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cause on every day, there is an early and a late shift.14 Work on the assembly line 
is completely standardized: at each work station, the workers assemble a certain 
element of a standardized type of truck in a fixed time that is given by the speed 
of the conveyor belt. Hence, at first glance, labor productivity at these 50 work 
stations (defined as the ratio of output units to units of labor input) appears to be 
independent of the work teams’ actions since quantity and quality of output is 
given as well as the time units of labor input. At second glance, however, produc-
tion quality differs across work teams as they can make errors. Variation in 
productivity thus becomes manifest only in the variation of production errors. 
This is a central feature of our approach. 
At the end of the assembly line, quality inspectors check the assembled 
trucks, record the errors and assign them to the work station where they oc-
curred. We observe 8564 errors in 100 teams on 973 days. The error rate is thus 
8.8 percent. Every error is given a weight that specifies the severity of the error. 
This severity weight depends on the costs to make up for the error. The severity 
weights range from 5 to 95 with mean 11 (median 10) and standard deviation 5.7. 
Our inverse productivity measure is then defined as the sum of errors per 
work team per day where the errors are rated with their respective weights. E.g., 
if a team makes two errors on a day with weights 5 and 30, our inverse produc-
tivity measure for this team for this day takes the value 35. Errors are relatively 
rare and most errors are small.  
The daily record of errors is our first core data set. Errors by work team are 
matched with personnel data, our second core data set.15 We observe 3824 work-
ers in 100 work teams at 50 workplaces on 973 work days during the years 2003 
through 2006. The personnel data are very rich and longitudinal. They inform us 
about the daily composition of the work teams, personal characteristics of the 
workers such as age, sex, education, nationality, job tenure, and whether or not a 
worker is in his regular team. They also record exits from jobs due to early re-
tirement, transfer to a different unit and promotion to group leader or a manage-
rial position. 
The age composition in the plant is fairly representative for the production 
line of a manufacturing plant. The share of workers aged 55 and over is low at 
the assembly line because many are already retired or have moved to better jobs. 
                                                 
14 To be precise: At every workplace there is a „team A“ and a „team B“. A-teams work early in even work 
weeks and late in uneven weeks. B-teams work early in uneven weeks and late in even weeks. 
15 Appendix A details how errors are matched with work teams and personnel data. Appendix B provides de-
scriptive statistics of all variables used in the paper. The distribution of the key variables is described in an ex-
tended version of this paper available upon request. 
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About 5% of the workers are older than 55 years. While this percentage is low, 
the absolute number is large: workers older than 55 years represent some 89,000 
worker-day-observations (out of a total of 1,767,030 observations). This large 
number permits a relatively precise measurement of age-productivity profiles up 
to the statutory retirement age of 65.  
Another key feature of our data is that errors are assigned to work teams. 
Hence, our primary unit of observation is the work team. The individual worker 
responsible for the error is not identified. This is a legal requirement. We think 
that this is an advantage rather than a disadvantage since it provides the ade-
quate solution to the aggregation problem in productivity studies. Workers oper-
ating in a team are supposed to help each other, and, consequently, also make 
errors in teams. If worker A “makes” an error, it might not be his fault because 
worker B did the preliminary work improperly or worker C assisted inadequate-
ly. Work teams are thus the appropriate aggregation unit in order to study age-
related productivity differences among workers at the assembly line. Due to per-
sonnel fluctuations across work teams, we are also able to identify the contribu-
tion of each individual worker to a work team’s productivity. In our results sec-
tion, we will show age-productivity profiles for both entire work teams and indi-
vidual workers. 
In addition to the two core data sets (errors and personnel) there are several 
supplemental data sets such as the daily production plan which gives us infor-
mation on the work load and information linking personnel ID, work station, 
shift and date which have allowed us to merge the data sets. 
3 Identification 
Aim of this paper is to relate labor productivity to age. The identification of 
this relation poses several methodological challenges: 
• Which variation across workers and teams should be exploited to identify 
the age-productivity relation? 
• How can we make sure that the observable variation in age is exogenous? 
• How can we deal with sample selection bias in the presence of early re-
tirement and career moves? 
• How can we distinguish age from cohort effects? 
They are dealt with in this section. 
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3.1 Identifying variation 
To a first degree, errors occurring at different work stations on the assembly 
line are strictly comparable because every error is given a severity weight that 
accounts for the costs of fixing that error. The severity weights thus translate 
every error into a common metric independent of the work stations’ specific tasks. 
Comparisons across teams at different work stations may nevertheless be a 
source of biases as work stations may be different with respect to the susceptibil-
ity to errors. Since we have nearly 1,000 observations per work team (973 work 
days spread over four years), we do not depend on comparisons across work 
teams. We prefer being on the safe side and take such potential differences into 
account by using work-team fixed effects.16 We therefore identify the relation be-
tween workers’ age and the errors they make by only using that variation in er-
rors and age over time which occurs within work teams where tasks are homoge-
neous, and avoid comparisons across potentially different work stations. In a sim-
ilar fashion, we insert a fixed effect for each worker in our individual-level re-
gressions. The age effect is thus identified by the variation in weighted errors 
over the four-year observation period. 
3.2 Exogeneity of variations in age 
As pointed out in the introduction, the age composition of a plant tends to be 
endogenous to labor productivity since, e.g., fast growing start-ups have freshly 
hired and thus typically younger staff than established companies. This problem 
is well known for studies of age-productivity profiles based on comparisons across 
plants or entire companies. 
Studies on individuals or work teams within plants may suffer from a similar 
problem if age affects the assignment of workers to tasks, e.g., if older workers 
are systematically assigned to work stations which have easier tasks. Hence, if 
productivity is measured by comparing workers at different work stations, the 
productivity of older workers may be overestimated. We avoid this problem by 
not using the variation across work stations in our estimation because we include 
work team fixed effects as described in the previous subsection.  
Correct identification in our case rests on the assumption that the variation in 
                                                 
16 Work-team fixed effects are not equal to work-station fixed effects because each work station has an early 
and a late shift. Because we want to avoid any potential endogeneity of the work team composition with respect 
to early vs. late shift, we choose fixed effects for work teams rather than a fixed effect for each work-station. 
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the age composition within work teams over time is exogenous and not subject to 
optimizing management decisions. The fluctuation within teams has two compo-
nents: The team composition changes from day to day as some workers call in sick 
(6%) and others are on vacation (12%) or have compensatory time off for extra 
hours workers (6%).17 This day-to-day fluctuation within the core team is random 
and not the result of any management decision.18 The second component of fluctu-
ation is the employment of so-called “team hoppers”. On days where the workers 
of the core team are too few to manage that day’s workload, the vacancies are 
filled with workers from other work teams. At this stage, there is in principle 
room for optimization, potentially creating an endogeneity problem. In practice, 
however, replacement decisions are made on very short notice with a rather lim-
ited pool of team hoppers. Optimization would require knowledge about the opti-
mal age composition for the day’s production program and the respective work 
team. Furthermore, a team hopper with the optimal characteristics has to be 
available. The managers in the plant convinced us that neither requirement is 
met in daily practice and that optimizing behavior would not pay off to justify 
their efforts. 
It is important to stress that the line managers do optimize the composition of 
the long-run team composition at every work station for a normal day. What is 
not optimized, however, are the short-run deviations from that composition. It is 
precisely this exogenous variation that we exploit in our estimation. 
3.3 Sample selectivity 
Workers older than 55 years are underrepresented in the work force. The 
same holds for our sample. The obvious suspicion is that the remaining workers 
are a positive selection. The less motivated, less healthy workers probably retire 
earlier or are made redundant. We correct for this selectivity bias in two ways: 
first by employing a Heckman-style selectivity-correction model and second by 
adding worker fixed effects in addition to the work team fixed effects described 
earlier. Worker fixed effects can be separately identified from work-team fixed 
effects due to personnel fluctuations across work teams described earlier. 
Since we have four years of personnel data, we have information on those 
                                                 
17 This means that in a team of 16 workers, on an average day, one worker is absent due to compensatory time 
off, another one due to sickness and two more workers are on vacation. In order to buffer these fluctuations, each 
work team has about 25% more members than are needed on a regular day.  
18 Workers who call in sick frequently may be less productive. However, this potential endogeneity problem 
is taken care of by our workers fixed effect. 
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workers who enter or exit the sample within the four-year observation period. 
This enables us to estimate a Heckman-style selection correction model. We use 
individual sickness rates as an instrument as they affect selection but have no 
effect on the number and severity of errors. Identification is further improved by 
the fact that selection is observed on the individual level while errors are ob-
served on the work team level. Since our observation unit in the regression anal-
yses is a work team while selection into the sample is an individual phenomenon, 
we aggregate individual Mills ratios to team Mills ratios (see Appendix C for de-
tails). 
There is a second selection process specific to our data. Our sample consists of 
workers on the assembly line only. Even the foremen are not included. Workers 
who leave our sample before the age of 65 may also be promoted to jobs off the 
assembly line, most likely because they performed better than those who remain. 
This creates a selectivity bias in the opposite direction of the above-mentioned 
one generated by early retirement of less productive workers. 
We therefore constructed different Mills ratios for younger workers who are 
more likely to leave the sample for jobs off the assembly line, and for older work-
ers who are more likely to leave the sample for early retirement. Both first stage 
regressions fit well with R2s of 0.25 and 0.28, see Appendix C. 
In addition to these Heckman-style corrections, we included worker fixed ef-
fects in order to correct for non-random sample selection. This is possible for the 
regressions where worker-days are the observation unit because workers move 
across work teams over time. This correction is particularly effective, see Section 
4.1, as it does not depend on instruments or functional assumptions. 
3.4 Age vs. cohort effects 
The well-known identification problem of age, cohort and time effects appears 
also in our data. Since we have panel data such that each cohort is observed at 
different ages, a distinction between age and cohort effects at the individual level 
is possible in principle if time effects are absent. Such time effects could be gen-
erated by changes in technology or organization that affect our productivity 
measure during the sample period. 
Indeed, there was a major technological and organizational change before 
2003. Thereafter, no further changes happened until 2006. The absence of chang-
es in technology or organization during these four years was the main reason for 
our choice of this time period. Given the absence of such time effects and the in-
clusion of cohort effects in the worker-specific constants of our fixed-effects re-
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gressions, age effects are identified at the individual worker’s level. 
While the relatively short observation period of 4 years guarantees the ab-
sence of technological change and thus time effects, the statistical basis for sepa-
rating age and cohort effects is weak. However, as we will see, it suffices to create 
significant differential effects.  
There is one more degree of freedom at the team level because average age of 
the team, average cohort of the team, and time are not perfectly correlated as 
they are at the individual worker’s level. We therefore include a time trend in the 
team level regressions to control for possible time effects and interact this trend 
with age, see Section 4.2. 
4 Results 
We present our regression results in two subsections. In Section 4.1, we ex-
ploit the fluctuation across work teams documented in Section 2 and display our 
age productivity profiles based on individual worker-days. Section 4.2 is dedicat-
ed to the separation of job tenure from residual age effects and to interaction ef-
fects. The regressions presented in this section are based on work team-days. Ta-
ble 1 illustrates our two-level approach: 
Table 1: Individual vs. work-team regressions 
 Section 4.1 Section 4.2 
Observation unit Worker day Team day 
Object Age productivity profile Interaction effects 
Effect of job tenure 
Work team fixed effects included Yes yes 
Worker fixed effects included Yes no 
Interactions with age included No yes 
Job tenure included No yes 
Number of control variables small large 
 
Regressions on the individual level are attractive because they permit a dis-
tinction between cohort effects and age effects, because dealing with sample selec-
tion is easier and more powerful, and because we can look at higher ages. Worker 
fixed effects remove differences between workers that are constant over time, in-
cluding cohort effects. Since time effects are absent during our observation period, 
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as explained in Section 3.4, we identify age effects. 
Worker fixed effects also help remove sample selection bias. If selection into 
and especially out of the sample is related to differences in health, motivation, etc. 
between workers that are constant over time, then the bias that results from this 
non-random selection is removed. 
Regressions on the individual level also allow us to identify effects at higher 
ages. Age-productivity profiles on the individual level range from 18 years to 65 
years while average work-team age ranges between 25 and 50 years. 
The main disadvantage of regressions at the individual level is collinearity: 
we cannot separate age from job tenure effects because on the individual level, 
after controlling for fixed effects, age and job tenure are perfectly collinear.19 
Therefore, we also ran regressions at the team level where average age and 
average job tenure are only imperfectly correlated even within work teams as the 
team composition changes from day to day. This allows us to identify the effect of 
job tenure given age. Another advantage of the team-level regressions is that the 
data set is smaller. This allows us to include many control variables and interac-
tions of control variables with. Thus we can study in great detail and functional 
flexibility which variables have an effect on the age-productivity profile. 
4.1 Regressions on the individual level 
We observe 3824 workers in 100 work teams on 973 days. While productivity 
is measured at the team level, the fluctuation of workers across work teams per-
mits us to attribute errors (and thus productivity) to individuals. The regressions 
on the individual level are based on more than 1.5 million worker-days. Our re-
gressions include age and a large set of control variables. We report on two speci-
fications, baseline and selectivity controlled. 
In order to allow for non-linear age effects, we use a piecewise linear specifica-
tion of average team age (5-year linear splines). Regression results are presented 
in Table 2, columns 1 and 2. Figures 1 and 2 display the resulting age profile of 
our inverse productivity measure (sum of severity-weighted errors per day). 
The results are striking. The average sum of severity-weighted errors declines 
until age 65. It is measured rather precisely up to age 60. The decline becomes 
insignificant at ages between 60 and 65 years where we have too few observa-
tions for precise estimation. This holds for both specifications, with and without 
selectivity correction, which are virtually identical, indicating that the worker 
                                                 
19 Even with non-linear specifications the problem of multi-collinearity is too severe. 
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Figure 1: Age productivity profiles (in terms of errors) 
 
Figure 2: Age productivity profiles (in terms of errors), Heckman correction 
fixed effects have already removed the selection bias. Our main result is no evi-
dence for a productivity decline in this assembly plant at least until age 60. 
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In Figures 3 and 4 (columns 3 and 4 in Table 2), we decompose our productivi-
ty measure in the frequency of errors (the number of errors per day) and the se-
verity of errors (given that an error occurred). For the frequency of errors (Figure 
2), we find a clearly increasing profile: Older workers make significantly more 
errors. On the other hand, the severity of errors is strongly decreasing with age 
(Figure 3). 
 
Table 2: Regression Results (individual level) 
 Dependent variable: sum of error weights  number of errors  
error severity 
(given an error oc-
curred) 
  basic specification  correcting for sample selec-tion  
correcting for 
sample selection  
correcting for  
sample selection  
 Age splines 
 17 – 25 years  0.155 (0.0174)   0.157 (0.0176)   0.0143 (0.00152)  -0.288 (0.0793) 
 25 – 30 years  0.0143 (0.0132)  0.0162 (0.0139)   0.00482 (0.00117)  -0.339 (0.0857) 
 30 – 35 years -0.0361 (0.0111)  -0.0344 (0.0116)  -0.000285 (0.000955)  -0.328 (0.0805) 
 35 – 40 years -0.0464 (0.0104)  -0.0493 (0.0107)   0.000130 (0.000884)  -0.385 (0.0821) 
 40 – 45 years  0.0171 (0.00996)   0.0152 (0.0104)   0.00555 (0.000869)  -0.389 (0.0736) 
 45 – 50 years -0.0499 (0.00962)  -0.0503 (0.00964)   0.000555 (0.000788)  -0.433 (0.0814) 
 50 – 55 years  0.00730 (0.00996)   0.00515 (0.0100)   0.00424 (0.000799)  -0.428 (0.0911) 
 55 – 60 years -0.0391 (0.0254)  -0.0653 (0.0314)  -0.00253 (0.00247)  -0.412 (0.272) 
 60 – 65 years -0.0611 (0.0822)  -0.0542 (0.0826)  -0.000638 (0.00618)  -0.214 (0.986) 
 control variables 
 workload  1.12 (0.00644)   1.12 (0.0644)   0.0996 (0.00559)   0.0174 (0.237) 
 workload2 -2.17 (0.0173)  -2.17 (0.173)  -0.184 (0.0146)   0.422 (0.465) 
 cycle time  0.0147 (0.00150)   0.0147 (0.00150)   0.00138 (0.000124)   0.0526 (0.0188 
 team size  0.0672 (0.00689)   0.0672 (0.00688)   0.00458 (0.000561)   0.0540 (0.0556) 
 (team size) 2 -0.00125 (0.000173)  -0.00125 (0.000173)  -0.000077 (0.0000137)   0.000342 (0.00162) 
 external  0.0440 (0.0234)   0.0445 (0.0235)   0.00530 (0.00202)  -0.136 (0.125 
 Late shift -0.100 (0.00821)  -0.100 (0.00821)  -0.00838 (0.000691)   0.104 (0.0473 
 days w/o change -0.000877 (0.000275)  -0.000873 (0.000275)  -0.000097 (0.0000227)   0.00313 (0.00152 
 tryout Axor -0.150 (0.0178)  -0.150 (0.0198)  -0.0145 (0.00178)   0.112 (0.117 
 tryout Atego  0.0317 (0.0198)   0.0328 (0.0193)   0.00594 (0.00184)  -0.174 (0.101 
 Monday  1.13 (0.0193)   1.13 (0.0193)   0.108 (0.00167)  -1.40 (0.630 
 Tuesday  1.10 (0.0191)   1.10 (0.0191)   0.103 (0.00164)  -1.33 (0.630 
 Wednesday  1.36 (0.0190)   1.36 (0.0190)   0.124 (0.00164)  -1.38 (0.629 
 Thursday  1.03 (0.0191)   1.03 (0.0191)   0.0984 (0.00164)  -1.40 (0.630 
 Friday  1.10 (0.0190)   1.10 (0.0190)   0.106 (0.00163)  -1.28 (0.629 
 inverse Mills  Ratio young     0.0471 (0.124)   0.00351 (0.0102)  -0.287 (0.814) 
 inverse Mills  Ratio old     0.170 (0.128)   0.00882 (0.0105)   0.392 (0.807) 
 Adj. R2 within  0.003    0.003    0.004    0.005  
 Adj. R2 between  0.438    0.438    0.519    0.031  
 # observations: 1,676,030   1,676,030    1,676,030   150,772  
 Unbalanced panel of 3,824 workers in 100 work teams on 973 work days. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications control for individual worker fixed effects and work team fixed effects. 
 
We interpret these results as follows. Errors are rare. They usually happen in 
especially tense situations, typically when things go wrong and there is little 
time to fix them. In these situations of improvisation, older more experienced 
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workers seem to know better which severe errors to avoid by all means. This con-
centration on the vital tasks—potentially at the cost of some minor errors—
implies that older workers perform better in terms of our overall productivity 
measure, the severity-weighted sum of errors. A detailed study of the regression 
coefficients in Table 2 reveals that the severity of errors is mostly explained by 
the age variables while the control variables are mostly insignificant. Hence, ex-
ternal conditions seem not to matter much. It is experience that prevents severe 
errors. For the number of errors, the opposite is true: Only three of the nine age 
splines are significant but almost all control variables. Higher age leads to more 
errors but other factors seem more important. 
 
Figure 3: Age profile for the frequency of errors 
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Figure 4: Age profile for the severity of errors 
4.2 Regressions on the team level 
We now change the observation unit to a team day where average team age 
and average job tenure are not perfectly correlated. This allows us to identify the 
effect of job tenure given age. In addition, we are able to include more control var-
iables and interactions of these with age.  
Age effects are again specified as piecewise linear 5-year-age splines.20 In ad-
dition, average team age is interacted with a large set of control variables. Aver-
age job tenure of the team is described by 4-year linear splines. Since the focus of 
this paper is on the relation between productivity and age, and the age effects are 
a function of the parameters of the age splines and the interaction terms, we rel-
egate the detailed regression coefficients to Appendix D and summarize our re-
sults in Figures 4 and 5 where the effect of age on inverse productivity (i.e., se-
verity-weighted errors) is decomposed in an “experience effect” and a “residual 
age effect”.21  
                                                 
20 We also tried other specifications, e.g., polynomials and dummies for 5-year age groups. The results are ro-
bust with respect to these different specifications. 
21 What we call “residual age effect” here is a composition of effects that come along with age like deteriorat-
ing health, declining cognitive abilities, etc. 
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As can be seen in Figure 5, the “residual age effect” is positive. The sum of er-
ror weights is larger in older work teams if job tenure is held constant. 
 
Figure 5: Sum of weighted errors: Inverse productivity by age 
 
Figure 6: Sum of weighted errors: Inverse productivity by job tenure 
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In Figure 6, the weighted sum of errors is plotted against average job tenure. 
Holding average age constant, work teams with longer average job tenure and 
supposedly more experience have a lower sum of error weights. Hence, for work-
ers who grow old in the plant, the productivity enhancing effect of accumulating 
more experience compensates the adverse “residual” age effect so that the overall 
age profile is rather flat. On the other hand, workers who are not able to accumu-
late experience in the plant face decreasing productivity as they age. 
Our regressions contain a large set of control variables. Since the focus of this 
paper is on the relation between productivity and age, we only comment on some 
interesting interaction effects of age with these variables. The corresponding fig-
ures are in Table D.3 in Appendix D.2. These interactions might also reflect dif-
ferences between cohorts in addition to age-specific differences.  
Up to an age of 40, the average number of schooling years has a negative ef-
fect on productivity. Presumably, workers who have spent long time in school are 
overqualified for (and bored of) the tasks on the assembly line. This effect dies 
away (and even reverses) as workers grow older. School education has changed 
over time and the interaction effects might reflect these differences. 
A higher share of women in the work team is bad for productivity in young 
teams and good in old teams. One explanation for this finding is that women 
make fewer errors but young male workers get distracted (and make more errors) 
if women are in the team.  
In large work teams, the sum of error weights is larger. Reasons for this effect 
may be lower team cohesion and impeded communication. Older workers seem to 
have more problems with large work teams. 
One potential objection is that the assembly line may have been set at a low 
speed to accommodate older workers and could run faster (and thus increase 
productivity) if there were fewer older workers in the plant. Our evidence, how-
ever, suggests that this is not the case. We have included an interaction term be-
tween workload and age in our regression. Its coefficient is negative and insignif-
icant, implying that, if anything, older workers are at least as good as younger 
workers in dealing with the higher workload generated by a faster running as-
sembly line.  
Cycle time, i.e., the time that workers have to perform their tasks on one car 
at the conveyer belt before the next car arrives, is an important variable to assess 
the external validity of our results. Cycle times are generally quite long in truck 
assembly (6 – 12 minutes) and much shorter in the production of passenger cars 
(1.5 – 5 minutes) and other assembly-line jobs. This difference may raise con-
cerns that our results might be specific to truck assembly where older workers 
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are not stressed by short cycle times. Since one part of the assembly plant (where 
drivers’ cabs are finished) has very short cycle times (2 – 3 minutes) variation in 
cycle times in our sample is between 2 and 12 minutes. While the interaction of 
cycle time with age has negative sign, implying that older workers find it harder 
to deal with short cycle times, the coefficient is tiny so that the age productivity 
profile is virtually unaffected. The coefficient of -0.003 means that a change in 
cycle time by 10 minutes changes the age gradient by -0.03 error points per year 
of age.  
We also included dummy variables for days on which new types trucks were 
assembled on a prototypical basis. These “tryouts” require workers to adapt to 
(slightly) new procedures. The negative sign of these variables indicates that the 
difficulties associated with a new type where overcompensated by the production 
plan (more workers or fewer cars on that day) or effective training. This effect 
wears out in older work teams implying that older workers find it harder to 
adapt to new procedures. This effect, however, is not significant. 
The richness of the production records in our data allowed us to include two 
weather variables. Weather might negatively affect productivity by reducing 
physical fitness (heat, humidity), by lowering workers’ motivation or enhancing 
workers’ spirits (nice weather). As it turns out, higher air pressure (implying nice 
weather) is good for productivity with no difference between age groups. On hot 
and humid days (>30°C and >70% relative humidity), older workers’ productivity 
goes down while, maybe somewhat surprisingly, younger workers’ productivity is 
higher on these days.22 
Fluctuation is bad for productivity. This effect is stronger among older work-
ers. 
Young workers are more productive on weekends while older workers are 
more productive during the week. However, we cannot exclude that the selection 
into and out of weekend shifts is non-random.  
Finally, the less than perfect correlation of average team age with average job 
tenure and time permits an estimation of a time trend which we also interact 
with average team age. Our results suggest that young workers’ productivity de-
creased over the four years of the observation period while the productivity of the 
older workers increased. The age productivity profile has thus over time become 
more favorable for the old. Over all work teams, the number and severity of er-
rors remained at the same level over these four years, corroborating our assump-
tion that there are no time effects generated by technological or technical change 
                                                 
22 After 2006, the assembly hall was equipped with air condition. 
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in the assembly plant that would bias our results. 
5 Conclusions 
Based on our study of the relation between workers’ age and their productivi-
ty in an assembly plant of a truck manufacturer, we cannot confirm the wide-
spread opinion that older workers are less productive than younger workers. We 
use data on errors made in the production process in which quality and quantity 
is as standardized as the time to produce a unit of output. This laboratory-like 
environment and a very large number of daily observations allows us to construct 
very precise inverse age-productivity profiles in the age range from 25 to 60 
years. 
Controlling for individual worker fixed effects and the availability of person-
nel data with an appropriate instrument for a Heckman-style selectivity correc-
tion allows us to adjust for sample selection bias. In addition, fixed effects pre-
vent us from confounding age and cohort age effects. Controlling for work team 
fixed effects ensures that the remaining variation we use to estimate the age 
productivity profile is exogenous since the identifying fluctuation due to sick 
leave, vacation and the compensation for overtime does not leave any room for 
optimization by the management. 
Our findings show that the average age-productivity profile of individual 
workers is increasing until age 65. Decomposition into the effect of job tenure and 
age reveals that it is indeed experience that keeps older workers productivity 
from falling. A decomposition of our productivity measure into the frequency of 
errors and error severity shows that the older workers’ competence is their ability 
to avoid especially severe errors. While older workers are slightly more likely to 
make errors, they hardly make any severe errors. The results suggest that older 
workers are especially able to grasp difficult situations and then concentrate on 
the vital tasks. 
Our results refer to a single plant only. We believe, however, that our results 
are typical for large-scale manufacturing and thus of general interest. Moreover, 
by choosing a truck assembly plant in which physical strength and agility is still 
quite important, we have stacked our cards in favor of finding declining age-
productivity, since these characteristics are well known to decline with age. Ex-
perience is likely to count even more, e.g., in the service industry. In addition, 
while the shape of the age productivity profile is certainly task-specific, the de-
composition into (i) experience effects and residual age effects, and into (ii) effects 
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on frequency and severity of errors, seems to be more fundamental. Finally, we 
hope that this kind of work encourages researchers to replicate this study in oth-
er work environments. 
Appendix 
A Matching error data and person-
nel data 
The error data contain information on the work team where the error oc-
curred. This information allows matching the error data with personnel data. 71 
percent of all errors in our data set can be related to one single work team. For 
the remaining 2490 of 8564 errors, the quality inspector specified as locus delicti 
an area of the assembly line that encompasses the workplaces of several work 
teams. In other cases, the quality inspector was able to unambiguously specify 
the workplace but not whether the error occurred during the early shift or the 
late shift. In these ambiguous cases, we created an observation for each possible 
outcome and attributed weights to these observations according to their probabil-
ity. The resulting heteroskedasticity is taken into account by computing Huber-
White robust standard errors. 
For example, if an error is uniquely attributed to a workplace but cannot be 
related to early or late shift, we create one observation where we attribute the 
error to the team that worked at this workplace in the early shift and an addi-
tional observation where we attribute the error to the team that worked at this 
workplace in the late shift. Each of these two observations enters our regressions 
with weight 0.5. 
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B Descriptive statistics 
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. 
Date Jan 29th 2005 Dec 20th 2004 Jan 7th 2003 Dec 20th 2006  
# errors 0.0895 0 0 8 0.598 
Error intensity 11 10 0 95 5.7 
weighted sum of errors 0.984 0 0 135 5.73 
individual age 37.1 36.9 17.5 65.2 10.5 
average team age 37.1 36.8 23 51.7 4.33 
individual job tenure 11.7 10.7 0 39.4 9.92 
average team tenure 11.7 11.2 0.0865 31.3 4.55 
female dummy 0.0418 0 0 1 0.208 
Share of women 0.0418 0 0 0.554 0.0662 
ind. years of schooling 11.3 11 9 20 2.16 
av. years of schooling 11.3 11.3 9 16.6 0.826 
dummy for technical training 0.367 0 0 1 0.482 
Share of workers with technical training 0.367 0.364 0 1 0.16 
dummy for car specific training 0.254 0 0 1 0.434 
Share of workers with car specific training 0.254 0.222 0 1 0.183 
Team size 14.4 14 4 36 4.44 
German dummy 0.653 1 0 1 0.473 
Share of Germans 0.653 0.662 0 1 0.163 
French dummy 0.26 0 0 1 0.434 
Share of French 0.26 0.25 0 1 0.155 
Turkish dummy 0.0410 0 0 1 0.192 
Share of Turkish 0.0410 0 0 0.418 0.0532 
dummy for external workers 0.0718 0 0 1 0.235 
Share of external workers 0.0718 0.0594 0 1 0.0859 
individual inverse Mills ratio young 0.297 0.204 0 3.19 0.354 
Team inverse Mills ratio young 5.34 4.63 0 20.1 3.33 
individual inverse Mills ratio old 0.098 0 0 3.21 0.172 
Team inverse Mills ratio old 1.76 1.37 0 12.3 1.32 
# consecutive days without change in team composition 10.2 4 1 200 15.4 
dummy for late shift 0.489 0 0 1 0.5 
dummy for Axor tryout 0.0634 0 0 1 0.244 
dummy for Atego tryout 0.0651 0 0 1 0.247 
excess work load 0.0163 0.0291 -0.458 0.826 0.134 
hot and humid (dummy, >30°C, >70% rel. humidity) 0.041 0 0 1 0.197 
air pressure (hPa) 1000.4 1000.5 968.5 1022.3 7.35 
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C Sample selection 
C.1 The problem 
Older workers are underrepresented in our sample. This might lead to a bias 
in the estimation of the age productivity profile if the selection into the sample is 
non-random with respect to productivity and age. There are two possible mecha-
nisms of sample selection that are related to productivity: 
• Early retirement 
• Stepping up the career ladder 
If those workers who are less motivated, less healthy, and less productive are 
more likely to retire early then those workers who remain in the sample are a 
positive selection. Early retirement thus potentially leads to an overestimation of 
the productivity of older workers relative to younger workers. If workers who are 
more productive are more likely to be promoted to jobs off the assembly line then 
those who remain in the sample are a negative selection. Selection due to careers 
thus potentially leads to an underestimation of the relative productivity of older 
workers. 
We try to correct this sample selection bias in two ways:  
1. Worker fixed effects 
2. Correction of selection bias à la Heckman (1979) 
C.2 Worker fixed effects 
Workers differ in productivity. If sample selection is related to these differ-
ences (and to age), the estimation of the age productivity profile in a cross section 
is biased. Controlling for worker fixed effects in the estimation removes the bias 
that results from differences between workers that are constant over time.  
C.3 Correction of selection bias à la Heckman 
(1979) 
We have non-random selection and the selection is different for old and young. 
Workers at the assembly line are not a random sample of the working age popu-
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lation. There is selection based on age (which is not a problem) but there is prob-
ably also selection based on something correlated with productivity (motivation, 
etc.). Younger workers may exit the sample if they are good enough to get a job 
outside the assembly line. Older workers may exit the sample if they are not good 
enough to keep working. 
C.3.1 Different selection for young and old 
We observe a person i at date t if he is still working at the assembly line. Sup-
pose that younger workers i remain in the sample (sy = 1) if some latent variable  
y
it itz γ ε
′ ⋅ +   is positive: 
                               ( )1 0 ,     0,1   i.i.d.y yit it it its z Nγ ε ε′ = ⋅ + > ∼                                     (1) 
Accordingly, selection for older workers is 
                               ( )1 0 ,     0,1   i.i.d.o oit it it its z Nγ ε ε′ = ⋅ + > ∼                                     (2) 
For given zit, the workers with high εit are observed. The probability that per-
son i is observed is 
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If a person is observed, the number of errors yit is given by 
                                                    it it ity x uβ′= ⋅ +                                                          (4) 
For given xit, individuals with high uit make more errors. Now, we need an as-
sumption regarding the relation between uit and the εit. We assume that  
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Now, what about the conditional means of uit with respect to the εit? 
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What's the expectation of yit given xit and zit such that we observe the worker? 
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The expected value of yit  given that worker i is observed is: 
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Equation (11) is estimated where the inverse Mills ratios ( )( )
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predictions from estimating equation (5) using a probit specification. Results 
from estimating equation (11) are reported in the central column of Table 2. Re-
sults from estimating equation (5) are in Table C.1. 
C.3.2 Errors on the team level 
So far, we considered the case where errors and selection are both observed at 
the individual level. In our data, however, the errors are observed at the team 
level. This makes correction of the selection bias a bit more complicated. If the 
team j is observed, the number of errors yit  is given by 
                                                           jt jt jty x uβ′= ⋅ +                                                (10) 
where xit are team characteristics like average age or share of women. For given 
xit, teams with high uit make more errors. Selection of workers into the sample is 
given by (equation: selection young) and (equation: selection young). Now, we 
need an assumption regarding the relation between uit and the  { } 1
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This implies that within the young and within the old, each individual εit of 
any worker i has the same effect on the team’s performance. The individual εit 
are i.i.d. The individual effects just add up. 
Now, what about the conditional means of uit with respect to the εit's? 
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What's the expectation of yit given xit and  { } 1
N
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The expected value of yit given that team j is observed is: 
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Equation (18) is estimated where the inverse Mills ratios ( )( )
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predictions from estimating equation (5) using a probit specification. Results 
from estimating equation (18) are reported in the second and third column of Ta-
ble 1. Results from estimating equation (5) are in Table C.1. 
C.3.3 Estimating the selection equation 
Table C.1 reports results from estimating the selection equation (5) using a 
probit specification: ( ) ( )0it it itP z zγ ε γ′ ′⋅ + > = Φ ⋅ . The left hand column reports the 
results from the selection equation for the younger workers (<40 years) while the 
right hand column contains the results for the older workers (≥ 40 years). An im-
portant variable that affects the probability of being in the sample but not the 
number and severity of errors is the individual sickness rate. For every worker, 
we calculate the average absence rate due to sickness and include it in the selec-
tion equation but not in the error regressions. A higher sickness rate increases 
the probability of remaining in the sample for the young and it decreases the 
probability of remaining in the sample for the old. This is in line with the notion 
the young workers who leave the sample are a positive selection while old work-
ers who leave the sample are a negative selection. In addition, we include for 
most variables the individual values as well as team averages which further im-
proves identification of the inverse Mills ratios in the second stage.   
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Table C.1: Regression results: sample selection 
dependent variable: dummy for being in the sample 
 workers younger than 40 years workers older than 40 years 
age dummies 
18 < age < 20 reference category   
20 < age < 22 -0.0130 (0.260)   
22 < age < 24  0.125 (0.000)   
24 < age < 26  0.178 (0.000)   
26 < age < 28  0.360 (0.000)   
28 < age < 30  0.543 (0.000)   
30 < age < 32  0.680 (0.000)   
32 < age < 34  0.781 (0.000)   
34 < age < 36  0.984 (0.000)   
36 < age < 38  1.01 (0.000)   
38 < age < 40  0.953 (0.000)   
40 < age < 42   reference category 
42 < age < 44   -0.351 (0.005) 
44 < age < 46    0.0770 (0.000) 
46 < age < 48   -0.0114 (0.376) 
48 < age < 50   -0.0694 (0.000) 
50 < age < 52    0.0236 (0.084) 
52 < age < 54    0.0659 (0.000) 
54 < age < 56   -0.375 (0.000) 
56 < age < 58   -0.916 (0.000) 
58 < age < 60   -2.03 (0.000) 
60 < age < 62   -1.73 (0.000) 
62 < age < 64   -0.526 (0.000) 
64 < age   -1.70 (0.000) 
average team age  0.0308 (0.000) -0.0516 (0.000) 
sickness rate  0.00641 (0.000) -0.00683 (0.000) 
years of schooling   0.0971 (0.000) -0.0294 (0.000) 
av. team schooling years  0.0605 (0.000) -0.289 (0.000) 
German dummy  1.03 (0.000)  0.196 (0.000) 
share of Germans in team -3.93 (0.000) -2.38 (0.000) 
French dummy  1.06 (0.000)  0.418 (0.000) 
share of French in team  -5.26 (0.000) -3.96 (0.000) 
Turkish dummy  1.45 (0.000)  0.259 (0.000) 
share of Turkish in team  -3.61 (0.000) -5.13 (0.000) 
female dummy -0.556 (0.000) -0.339 (0.000) 
share of women in team  -0.821 (0.000) -0.121 (0.250) 
late shift  0.379 (0.000) -0.395 (0.000) 
team hopper dummy -0.740 (0.000) -1.75 (0.000) 
share of team hoppers in team  -3.30 (0.000) -1.56 (0.000) 
team size -0.00659 (0.000)  0.0255 (0.000) 
av. Team tenure  0.00438 (0.009)  0.0547 (0.000) 
Finishing of driver’s cabin  0.0741 (0.000) -0.640 (0.000) 
Constant  0.190 (0.065)  5.92 (0.000) 
R2  0.247   0.285  
# observations 2030939  1164115  
p-values in parentheses 
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D Detailed regression results (team 
level) 
 
Table D.1: Regression results (team level) 
Dependent variable: sum of error weights 
 correcting for sample selection, controlling for job tenure 
age splines  job tenure splines 
20 – 25 years  7.51 (2.02)  00 – 04 years -1.62 (0.360) 
25 – 30 years  4.52 (0.789)  04 – 08 years  0.0155 (0.0668) 
30 – 35 years  4.13 (0.782)  08 – 12 years -0.0908 (0.0353) 
35 – 40 years  4.08 (0.781)  12 – 16 years  0.0814 (0.0319) 
40 – 45 years  4.11 (0.780)  16 – 20 years -0.148 (0.0309) 
45 – 55 years  3.98 (0.786)  20 – 24 years -0.237 (0.0649) 
    24 – 32 years -0.849 (0.205) 
control variables  interactions of these control  variables with average team age 
schooling years  3.05 (0.449)  -0.0764 (0.0122) 
car specific educ -1.35 (2.34)   0.0497 (0.0608) 
tech spec. educ  3.92 (2.40)  -0.0963 (0.0621) 
Female 26.0 (5.29)  -0.693 (0.145) 
French -7.62 (4.31)   0.180 (0.112) 
German -10.5 (3.95)   0.259 (0.104) 
Turkish -6.82 (5.69)   0.186 (0.149) 
External -3.45 (2.56)   0.0694 (0.0659) 
team size  0.138 (0.104)   0.00793 (0.00244) 
(team size)2 -0.00644 (0.00110)    
late shift -0.000165 (0.413)  -0.00261 (0.0106) 
days w/o change  0.0325 (0.166)  -0.000872 (0.000421) 
(days w/o change)2 -0.0000488 (0.0000310)    
cycle time  0.276 (0.0544)  -0.00298 (0.00136) 
Workload  8.24 (2.43)  -0.0250 (0.0603) 
(workload)2 -12.5 (0.936)    
tryout Axor -2.01 (1.08)   0.0375 (0.0276) 
tryout Atego  0.969 (1.08)  -0.0223 (0.0276) 
air pressure -0.0122 (0.0276)   0.0000249 (0.000699) 
hot and humid -4.62 (1.00)   0.113 (0.0264) 
Monday  8.37 (0.994)  -0.198 (0.0257) 
Tuesday  6.78 (0.983)  -0.158 (0.0254) 
Wednesday 12.4 (0.981)  -0.290 (0.0253) 
Thursday  7.84 (0.986)  -0.184 (0.0255) 
Friday  12.2 (0.987)  -0.282 (0.0255) 
time trend  2.91 (0.249)  -0.0717 (0.00635) 
Inverse Mills  
Ratio young  0.246 (0.0251)    
Inverse Mills  
Ratio old  0.366 (0.0513)    
adj. R2 within  0.044     
adj. R2 between  0.081     
# observations: 95,684 (unbalanced panel of 100 work teams on 973 work days). Huber-White robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications control for work team fixed effects. 
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Table D.1 includes age as a function of age splines and interactions of age 
with a large set of control variables given by: 
50
0 , 5 , 5 ,
20
   a a a a k k age k k
a k k
sum of error weights AgeSpline x x AverageAgeβ β β β ε+ +
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +∑ ∑ ∑    (18) 
where subscripts for work teams and days are omitted for the sake of clarity. xk 
are the control variables and xk AverageAge⋅  are interactions of these control vari-
ables with average team age. 
The gradient of the errors-age-profile (evaluated at sample means and dis-
played in Figure 3) is thus the linear combination of the coefficients on the inter-
actions (where coefficients on interaction terms are multiplied by the sample 
means of the respective variables) and the coefficient on the respective age spline. 
The gradient of the error-age profile at age 37 is for example given by:  
                       ( ) 35 40 ,
  37
  
age k k
kAverageAge
sum of errorweights
x
AverageAge
β β−
=
∂
= + ⋅
∂ ∑                      (19) 
where 1
I T
k kit
i t
x x
I T
= ⋅
⋅ ∑∑  is the sample mean of variable xk. These gradients and 
their significance levels are reported in Table D.2. 
Table D.2: Residual age gradients and job tenure gradients 
age  residual age gradient   job tenure   tenure gradient 
20 –  25 years   3.48 (1.86)  0 – 4 years  -1.62 (0.360) 
25 –  30 years   0.493 (0.118)  4 – 8 years   0.0155 (0.0668) 
30 –  35 years   0.101 (0.0423)  8 – 12 years  -0.0908 (0.0353) 
35 –  40 years   0.0451 (0.0280)  12 – 16 years   0.0814 (0.0319) 
40 – 45 years   0.0796 (0.0348)  16 – 20 years  -0.148 (0.0399) 
45 –  55 years  -0.0467 (0.0737)  20 – 24 years  -0.237 (0.0649) 
     24 – 32 years  -0.849 (0.205) 
Gradients are calculated from coefficients in Table 2 at mean values of all control variables. 
Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table D.3 reports the marginal effects of selected control variables at different 
ages. 
Table D.3: Marginal effects of some control variables at different ages 
 years of schooling share of women French German Turkish team size days w/o change 
30 years 0.762 (0.0973) 
5.19 
(1.12) 
-2.22 
(1.05) 
-2.71 
(0.924) 
-1.24 
(1.36) 
0.233 
(0.0293) 
0.00537 
(0.00435) 
40 years -0.00346 (0.0691) 
-1.74 
(0.873) 
-0.398 
(0.550) 
-0.119 
(0.492) 
0.610 
(0.732) 
0.312 
(0.0194) 
-0.00331 
(0.00262) 
50 years -0.769 (0.173) 
-8.67 
(2.12) 
1.43 
(1.42) 
2.47 
(1.34) 
2.46 
(1.92) 
0.391 
(0.0329) 
-0.0120 
(0.00550) 
       
 excess workload cycle time tryout Axor air pressure hot and humid 
30 years 7.43 (0.689) 
0.185 
(0.0152) 
-0.882 
(0.268) 
-0.0113 
(0.00696) 
-1.24 
(0.232) 
40 years 7.21 (0.351) 
0.156 
(0.00785) 
-0.507 
(0.109) 
-0.0113 
(0.00263) 
-0.104 
(0.117) 
50 years 6.98 (0.706) 
0.127 
(0.0162) 
-0.131 
(0.323) 
-0.0112 
(0.00794) 
1.03 
(0.336) 
      
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday time trend 
30 years 2.44 (0.244) 
2.05 
(0.242) 
3.70 
(0.241) 
2.33 
(0.243) 
3.79 
(0.242) 
0.761 
(0.0643) 
40 years 0.468 (0.117) 
0.477 
(0.116) 
0.809 
(0.116) 
0.498 
(0.117) 
0.971 
(0.116) 
0.0464 
(0.0301) 
50 years -1.51 (0.316) 
-1.10 
(0.312) 
-2.08 
(0.312) 
-1.34 
(0.313) 
-1.85 
(0.314) 
-0.668 
(0.0758) 
       
Gradients are calculated from coefficients in the second column of Table 2. Huber-White robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. The reference category for weekday dummies is saturdays and sundays on some 
of which the assembly line was running. 
 
  
 1 
E Sample of a Production Program 
truck type 66 67 68 70 71 72 74 80 81 75 76 77 79 
driver's cab LKN high roof LKN short LKN long SKN short SKN medium SKN long SKN LH SKN-C long SKN-C high roof MPII short MPII medium MPII long MPII LH 
07.01. - 17.01.03 5 56 7 13 17 21 4 3 7 1 4 11 18 
20.01. - 31.01.03 3 49 6 14 22 25 7 4 4 1 2 10 20 
03.02. - 14.02.03 4 50 6 17 18 26 9 3 6   1 9 15 
17.02. - 28.02.03 5 47 8 21 14 27 9 4 7 1 2 9 12 
05.03. - 14.03.03 3 45 9 15 15 32 7 3 9 1 2 11 13 
17.03. - 28.03.03 5 46 7 13 16 32 5 3 8 3 3 11 14 
31.03. - 11.04.03 4 48 7 15 17 27 7 5 6   4 12 14 
14.04. - 17.04.03 3 53 7 11 18 28 7 5 5 1 3 12 15 
22.04. - 30.04.03 4 51 7 12 15 31 5 3 5 2 4 13 17 
05.05. - 16.05.03 4 51 5 16 14 28 3 3 5 3 7 14 15 
19.05. - 28.05.03 4 53 6 12 15 23 3 3 5 7 10 13 15 
02.06. - 13.06.03 4 51 6 9 7 20 4 4 6 5 11 23 16 
16.06. - 27.06.03 4 50 6 12 8 16 4 4 6 5 12 28 15 
30.06. - 11.07.03 4 50 6 11 7 16 1 5 6 9 12 26 17 
14.07. - 18.07.03 3 55 5 0 0 0 0 10 4 13 20 30 21 
21.07. - 01.08.03 3 50 4 0 0 0 0 7 6 11 16 26 19 
04.08. - 15.08.03 4 49 6 0 0 0 0 5 6 10 15 27 21 
18.08. - 29.08.03 3 49 7 0 0 0 0 4 5 12 14 30 21 
01.09. - 12.09.03 3 50 6 0 0 0 0 4 7 11 12 35 18 
15.09. - 26.09.03 4 58 8 0 0 0 0 5 9 12 17 48 27 
29.09. - 10.10.03 5 52 14 0 0 0 0 5 7 12 21 51 24 
13.10. - 24.10.03 6 51 14 0 0 0 0 5 5 12 21 49 28 
27.10. - 31.10.03 4 62 8 0 0 0 0 3 8 13 26 45 23 
03.11. - 14.11.03 7 52 12 0 0 0 0 5 4 13 15 59 23 
17.11. - 28.11.03 5 54 14 0 0 0 0 4 5 15 18 52 25 
01.12. - 12.12.03 4 51 15 0 0 0 0 3 6 15 21 42 29 
15.12. - 09.01.04 6 48 13 0 0 0 0 4 5 18 18 46 23 
This table shows the numbers of trucks of the 13 different types that are produced on each day. The program changes every two weeks. The program is the same for all work teams on the as-
sembly line.  
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